In 1967, with the objective of enhancing intelligence gathering and bolstering the influence of the Republic of Vietnam in rural areas, the United States Central Intelligence Agency CIA and the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) initiated coordinated efforts to monitor the activities of the Liberation Forces. From the U.S. perspective, the revolutionary bases established by the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam were perceived as being closely interconnected. Consequently, the U.S. military and the Saigon government recognized the necessity of an organization to disrupt and dismantle these networks.
On May 9, 1967, the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program was established, assuming control over U.S. military pacification efforts in South Vietnam. In order to enhance intelligence on enemy activities, CORDS initiated the Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation (ICEX) program in July 1967. Five months later, the South Vietnamese government renamed the program "Phoenix" or "Phụng Hoàng" (in accordance with the terminology used in the southern region).
The shoulder patch of the Phoenix Program (original)
The Phoenix Program (1968–1975) was a covert intelligence and assassination operation conducted by the United States during the Vietnam War. It was executed by the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) of the Republic of Vietnam, in collaboration with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States. The primary objective of the program was to identify and "neutralize" – through capture, recruitment, assassination, or suppression – operatives of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF) who were embedded within rural areas of South Vietnam. These individuals were responsible for recruiting and training local support networks for the Liberation Army, and they also played a key role in supporting the armed struggle against the government of South Vietnam.
The shoulder patch of the Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation-ICEX (original)
The "Phoenix" program was organized into a four-tier organizational structure: central, regional, provincial, and district levels. At the central level, the program was overseen by "Central Phoenix Committee" chaired by Tran Thien Khiem. The regional and provincial levels were led by the Regional and Provincial Chiefs, while the district level was managed by the "Joint Military Intelligence Center", headed by the District Chief, who also served as the District Military Sub-Sector Chief (or, more briefly, the District Phoenix Organization). As the level responsible for the direct implementation of the program, the district level played a critical role. This was explicitly detailed in “Basic Operational Directive No. 3”, which outlined two primary functions:
- To enhance the personnel capacity of the District Chief (or Center Chief), while simultaneously unifying command and operations in the mission to eradicate Communist forces.
- To centralize all classified intelligence gathered by security and intelligence agencies within the district for analysis, evaluation, and the coordination of rapid verification, thereby facilitating a prompt local response.
The District Operational Intelligence Coordination Center was regarded as a vital operational entity within the Phoenix Program. Accordingly, the primary responsibilities of the district-level "Phoenix" organizations encompassed:
- Executing directives from the higher-level Phoenix Committee, operating continuously, 24 hours a day.
- Coordinating and guiding the activities of member agencies and military units within the district, specifically with regard to intelligence gathering, maintaining security, and conducting operations aimed at dismantling Communist infrastructure.
- Identifying Communist organizations within the administrative territory, as well as supporting structures at the village and hamlet levels.
- Swiftly utilizing collected intelligence and carrying out operations to dismantle Communist infrastructure in the local area.
- Timely dissemination of critical intelligence to facilitate the elimination of revolutionary bases.
- Exchanging intelligence information.
- Reporting on the successful elimination of revolutionary bases.
Organizational chart of the "Phoenix" Committee pursuant to Decree No. 280-a/TT/SL dated July 1, 1968 of the Republic of Vietnam:
Organizational structure of the District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Center:
The core personnel involved in the "Phoenix" Program were the designated "members," which included the following individuals: the village chief, deputy village chief for security, military advisor, intelligence officers for the Chieu Hoi program, head of the national police division, rural development team leader, armed propaganda team leader for Chieu Hoi, platoon leader of the local militia, head of the self-defense forces, Chieu Hoi officers, rural development officers, military intelligence personnel, police officers, and members of the self-defense forces...
In the initial stages, the intelligence gathered did not produce significant results. It was not until the revolutionary bases were exposed during the Tet Offensive and Uprising of 1968 that the "Phoenix" Program began to yield valuable intelligence. According to the United States, in 1968 alone, following the Tet Offensive, over 13,000 Viet Cong operatives were captured or killed as a result of the Phoenix Program. The National Liberation Front cadres who were captured were treated as criminals, prosecuted, imprisoned (or executed), or coerced into defecting from the Communist ranks and surrendering to the government. One of the U.S. military's measures aimed at disrupting the revolutionary network in rural areas involved conducting raids and searches: the military would encircle a village suspected of hosting National Liberation Front activities, interrogate the residents, and subsequently relocate them. Some operations also employed military tactics, such as ambushing liberation forces in the gaps between hamlets. Since 1968, the CIA expanded its advisory and financial support for the program. By 1970, there were 705 American Phoenix advisors deployed across 44 provinces in South Vietnam.
According to U.S. statistics, from 1968 to 1972, the 'Phoenix' Program resulted in the imprisonment, inducement to surrender, or death of more than 81,000 individuals suspected of being liberation fighters, of whom over 26,000 were killed.
Writer: Đặng Hồ Xuân Hương